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Abstract: Important differences exist between communities with respect to their needs, capacities 
and circumstances.   As central governments are not able to discern these differences fully, they seek 
to achieve their policy objectives by relying on decentralized mechanisms that utilize local 
information. However, household and individual characteristics within communities can also vary 
substantially.  A growing theoretical literature suggests that inequality within communities can 
influence policy outcomes, and that this influence could be harmful or helpful, depending on the 
circumstances.  Empirical investigations into the impact of inequality have, to date, largely been held 
back by a lack of systematic evidence on community-level inequality.  This paper uses household 
survey and population census data to estimate per capita consumption inequality within communities 
in three developing countries: Ecuador, Madagascar, and Mozambique.  Communities are found to 
vary markedly from one another in terms of the degree of inequality they exhibit.  We also show that 
there should be no presumption that inequality is less severe in poor communities.  We argue that the 
kind of community-level inequality estimates generated in this paper can be utilized in designing and 
evaluating decentralized anti-poverty programs.  
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Governments in developing countries commonly implement decentralized anti-
poverty programs that are designed to distribute assets or cash to individuals or households.  
In many such cases, the central government first distributes its poverty reduction budget to 
communities, and these are then left to decide how to allocate that budget across individuals.    
Social Funds projects provide a well-known example from the family of community based 
development (CBD) initiatives, in which poor communities are required to identify, apply 
for funding, design, implement and manage their projects (Mansuri and Rao, 2003).
1  These 
initiatives aim to improve poverty targeting and implementation of projects by making use 
of information at the local level and by involving local participation. However, in practice 
these potential benefits may be outweighed by the possibility of resources being captured by 
local elites.
2  For example, in their review of the CBD approach, Mansuri and Rao (2003) 
argue that while potential gains from CBD efforts are large, there are also important risks 
inherent in the basic precepts of the approach.  
Uncertainty around the ultimate impact of such programs implies that a blanket 
application of a given approach in all communities may not be appropriate.  Again, Mansuri 
and Rao (2003) caution against the wholesale scaling-up of best-practices identified in one, 
or perhaps several, pilot settings, as the success of such pilot projects might depend crucially 
on local conditions that are not observed elsewhere.  At the same time, it is clear that 
administrators of large projects, such as a country-wide cash transfer or Social Funds 
program, are unable to take into account the full range of local characteristics that could 
                                                            
1 Mansuri and Rao (2003) distinguish CBD from Community Driven Development (CDD), popularized by the 
World Bank, in that the latter refer to projects where communities have direct control over key project decisions 
as well as the management of investment funds.  CBD can be thought of as a broader umbrella term that 
accommodates but is not restricted to the World Bank’s CDD concept.  4
possibly affect project performance.  Hence, policymakers are confronted with the 
challenging task of designing schemes that do take critical local information into account, 
but are not prohibitively costly in terms of their implementation. 
One way governments have traditionally broached this problem is to categorize 
communities by easily observable characteristics and then adapt schemes for different 
groups.  For example, while local level data on poverty are generally unavailable, 
government programs often draw on proxy indicators – believed to be correlated with local 
poverty conditions – to determine eligibility of communities for various projects.  As we 
discuss below, there is emerging theoretical analysis and empirical evidence that suggests 
that local inequality may also affect local development outcomes.  However, such 
information has not generally made its way into program design.  There seem to be two 
main reasons why local inequality is not explicitly considered in program design.  First, until 
recently estimates of local inequality measures have not been widely available.  While basic 
needs-type indices have been used in place of the missing income (or expenditure) poverty 
measure, such proxies have not been available for income inequality.
3  Second, when the 
target of an intervention is a small, poor community, inequality may not be considered of 
primary importance:  it seems natural to assume that in the poorest communities in the 
developing world livelihoods are at the subsistence level and so there is little scope for 
pronounced variation in wellbeing across households and individuals. 
 This paper addresses these two issues.  First, using data from Ecuador, Madagascar, 
and Mozambique, we apply a newly developed methodology to estimate local-level welfare 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 A vivid illustration of elite capture problems in practice and a theoretical treatment of this issue are provided 
in Platteau and Gaspart (2003). 
3 McKenzie (2003) provides a recent attempt to proxy local inequality on the basis of easily observed correlates 
of household income.   5
outcomes combining the detailed information available from a household survey with the 
large-scale representation of the population census.  We suggest that meaningful estimates 
of income or expenditure inequality for small areas can be obtained for many countries on 
the basis of these techniques.  Second, we show that there is great heterogeneity in 
inequality across these communities in each country.  We find that this heterogeneity in 
local inequality levels is still present when we focus our attention on the poorest 
communities in rural areas.  The combined implication of these findings is that information 
on local inequality is available for use by program implementers and that this information 
can help to categorize communities even after conditioning on local poverty and type of 
area. 
 
How Can Local Inequality Affect Welfare Outcomes? 
Mansuri and Rao (2003) present a comprehensive overview of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the relationship between local inequality and development outcomes.  
Two critical issues emerge: First, how does inequality within a community influence the 
targeting impact of a particular project, and second, how does local inequality shape the 
degree and nature of collective action within communities?   
Recent theoretical analysis suggests that inequality may affect targeting outcomes of 
social funds projects or anti-poverty transfer schemes by reducing the relative power of the 
intended beneficiaries (Galasso & Ravallion, 2004; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1999).  The 
advantage of such decentralized approaches to make use of better community-level 
information about priorities and the characteristics of residents could be offset by the 
possibility that the local governing body is controlled by elites – who may have different  6
objectives than the poor within their communities.  While the predictions from this 
theoretical work are ambiguous, limited empirical evidence shows that both the pros and the 
cons of decentralized decision-making are at work in various countries.  For example, 
Alderman (2002) finds in Albania that communities were able to improve targeting by using 
information unavailable to the central government. On the other hand, Galasso & Ravallion 
(2004) find that high levels of local inequality (measured in terms of landholdings) were 
associated with worse targeting performance under the Food for Education program in 
Bangladeshi villages. 
A detailed case study of the north Indian village of Palanpur provides one illustration 
of the manner in which local elites are able to appropriate for their own purposes resources 
and opportunities made available to the community through public provisioning.  Drawing 
on information collected in this small village over the period spanning the late 1950s 
through the early 1990s, Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma (1998) document the introduction of 
18 types of government-provided programs in the village.  These include a public works 
village-road building program, free schooling, free basic health care, old-age pensions, a 
fair-price shop, a farmer’s cooperative, and so on.  The sobering diagnosis is that the large 
majority of these programs were for all practical purposes non-functional, particularly 
wherever there existed a redistributive component.  Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma (1998) 
argue that a key explanation for this dispiriting record is that, at the village level, collective 
institutions were dominated by privileged groups.   This means that only those programs that 
enjoyed strong backing from the politically advantaged segment of the village were allowed 
to succeed.  Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma (1998) argue that “there is little prospect of major  7
improvement in the orientation and achievements of government intervention without a 
significant change in the balance of political power, both at the state and at the local level”.
 4 
There is also a rich literature on the relationship between inequality and collective 
action with implications on the provision of public goods, management of common pool 
resources, and group participation (Olson, 1973; Balland and Platteau, 1999, 2001, 2003;  
Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan, 2002, among others). This literature points to the possibility, 
at least in principle, that some inequality may be necessary in order to mobilize the 
collective action needed for group provision of a public good (Olson, 1973).  The argument 
is that if a community is large and homogeneous, no single individual could make any 
significant difference in the provision of the public good, and hence all would want to free-
ride, resulting in no provision.  
Again, the theoretical relationship between inequality, participation and collective 
action is complex.  However, most of the empirical evidence seems to point to a negative or 
a U-shaped relationship, where increased inequality leads, at least initially, to a decline in 
collective action (Dayton-Johnson, 2000; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2002), Khwaja 
(2001); Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), La Ferrara (2002)).   
The growing literature on the relationship between local inequality and development 
outcomes thus suggests that there are a number of ways in which development efforts, such 
as those described in this paper, could be influenced by local inequality.  The empirical 
literature, while still far from complete, suggests that on balance inequality is likely to 
hamper local development efforts.  It is for this reason that incorporating information on 
                                                            
4 The review by Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma (1998) does not cover any specific CBD projects in Palanpur.  It 
is possible that performance of such projects might have been different.  The review does indicate, however, 
that any notion of the villagers in Palanpur all having the same objectives, interests, and influence would be 
sorely mistaken.  That villagers differed in terms of economic well-being was clearly discernable in the study:   8
inequality into the design of development efforts might be necessary.  This paper argues that 
such information can be obtained with data available in many developing countries. 
 In the next section we describe the methodology underlying the estimation of local 
welfare indicators and our data, and section 3 discusses the plausibility and the precision of 
our inequality estimates in Ecuador, Madagascar, and Mozambique.  In section 4, we 
examine the importance of local-level inequality by decomposing national inequality in each 
of the three countries into a within-community and between-community component.  Also 
in this section, we argue that this decomposition exercise produces a summary statistic that 
masks significant heterogeneity in inequality across communities.  In section 5, we provide 
evidence that this heterogeneity in inequality is evident even among poor rural communities.  
Section 6 discusses implications for policy. 
 
2.  Data and Methodology 
The data used in this study consist of a household survey and a population census 
from Ecuador, Madagascar, and Mozambique.  Table 1 presents the basics on each of the 
data sources, such as year, sample size, stratification, etc.  For more detail on the data, refer 
to the studies listed in the References row in Table 1. 
Construction of comprehensive geographic profiles of inequality across localities 
has been constrained by the limitations of conventional distributional data.  Detailed 
household surveys, which include reasonable measures of income or consumption, are 
samples and thus are rarely representative or of sufficient size at low levels of 
disaggregation to yield statistically reliable estimates.  At the same time, census (or large 
                                                                                                                                                                             
income inequality within Palanpur was on the same orders of magnitude as measures of inequality for India as a 
whole (Lanjouw and Stern, 1998).  9
sample survey) data of sufficient size to allow disaggregation either have no information 
about income or consumption, or measure these variables poorly.
5 
Using a recently developed statistical procedure to combine data sources so as to 
take advantage of the detailed information available in household sample surveys and the 
comprehensive coverage of a census, this paper provides estimates of inequality at a level of 
disaggregation previously unattainable in each of the three countries. The methodology is 
developed in detail by Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2002 and 2003a), and applications are 
described in a series of papers (Demombynes et. al., 2002, Elbers et. al., 2002, and Mistiaen 
et. al., 2002 among others), so we provide only the briefest description here.   
First a model of log per capita household expenditures, y, is estimated using the 
sample survey data, restricting the explanatory variables to those either common to both the 
survey and the census, or variables in a tertiary dataset that can be linked to both of those 
data sets.
6  Then, letting W represent an indicator of poverty or inequality, we estimate the 
expected level of W given the census-based observable characteristics of the population of 
interest using parameter estimates from the ‘first-stage’ model of y.  The same approach 
could be used with other household measures of wellbeing, such as assets, income, or 
employment.   
The first-stage estimation is carried out using the household sample survey. Our first 
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5 See Alderman et al. (2003) 
6 As described in Elbers et. al (2003a), a separate model is estimated for each stratum, rather than forcing the 
models and the parameter estimates to be the same for the whole country.  10
where household h is located in sample cluster c, η  and ε  are uncorrelated with each other 
and are uncorrelated with observables. This specification allows for an intracluster 
correlation in the disturbances. For any given disturbance variance, 
2
ch σ , the greater the 
fraction due to the common component η c, the less one benefits from aggregating over more 
households. Welfare estimates become less precise. Further, failing to account for spatial 
correlation in the disturbances could bias the inequality estimates. 
A Hausman test described in Deaton (1997) is used to determine whether to estimate 
with household weights. 
2 R ’s for our models are generally high, ranging between 0.45 and 
0.77 in Ecuador, 0.29 to 0.63 in Madagascar, and 0.27 to 0.55 in Mozambique.
7  
We next model the variance of the idiosyncratic part of the disturbance, 
2
,ch ε σ . To 
model heteroskedasticity in the household-specific part of the residual, we choose between 5 
and 20 variables, zch, that best explain variation in 
2
ch e  out of all potential explanatory 
variables, their squares, and interactions.
8  
Finally, we determine the distribution of η  and ε  using the cluster residuals  c η ˆ  and 
standardized household residuals.  We use normal or t distributions with varying degrees of 
freedom, or the actual standardized residual distribution mentioned above when taking a 
semi-parametric approach.  Before proceeding to simulation, the estimated variance-
covariance matrix is used to obtain final GLS estimates of the first stage consumption 
model.  
At this point we have a full model of consumption that can be used to simulate any 
expected welfare measures with associated prediction errors. 
                                                            
7 Again, see Elbers et al. (2002), Mistiaen et al. (2002) and Simler and Nhate (2002) for details.  11
 
3.  Estimates of Local Inequality in Three Countries 
In this section, we examine how our census-based estimates compare with estimates 
from the countries’ respective surveys at the level at which those surveys are representative.
9  
If the methodology we employ is applied properly, with proper attention to data 
comparability issues, first-stage regression models and the error structures used in 
simulating the inequality measures, then stratum level estimates should naturally correspond 
closely to those in the household survey. 
Table 2 presents estimates of average per capita consumption for each country from 
both the household survey and census at the stratum level, for which the household survey is 
representative.   Indeed, in nearly every case we cannot reject that estimates of average per 
capita consumption across the two data sources are the same (at the 95% confidence level).  
With few exceptions point estimates match closely.  Note that the standard errors of the per 
capita consumption estimates in the census are almost always smaller than those in the 
household survey.  While the census estimates are predicted with error mainly due to the 
imprecision of the first-stage regressions, they are free of sampling error, making them more 
precise than their counterparts from the household survey. 
Comparing stratum-level estimates of inequality across the census and survey is less 
straightforward. Inequality measures tend to be sensitive to the tails in the distribution of 
expenditure.  Since far-off portions of the tails are typically not observed in the survey 
(because of its small sample size), the survey estimates of inequality will often be below the 
true level of inequality.  Perhaps more importantly, non-response may be of some 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 We limit the number of explanatory variables to be cautious about over-fitting and use a bounded logistic 
functional form.   12
importance in a household survey, and to the extent that non-response can be expected to be 
more prevalent among rich households, the resulting selection bias will lead to further 
downward bias of survey-based estimates.
10  To the extent that a census suffers less from 
such problems of observation, and assuming that the expenditure model is correct, the 
expenditure of rich households will be better represented in the census-based estimates of 
inequality.  These considerations lead one to expect higher inequality estimates from census-
bases imputation.  
Table 3 presents estimates of the Gini-coefficient in our three countries. Standard 
errors are presented for all estimates – reflecting the complex sample design of the 
household survey for the survey-based estimates, and our imputation procedure for the 
census based estimates.  For Ecuador and Mozambique, we can see that the census estimates 
of consumption inequality tend to be higher than the survey based estimates, although not 
generally to such an extent that one can reject that they are the same (Table 3).
11  Note that 
for some provinces in Mozambique, such as Sofala, Maputo Province and Maputo City, the 
estimates from the census are not only higher than those in the survey, but also happen to be 
quite imprecisely estimated.
12   
In Madagascar, it is the standard errors on the survey estimates of inequality that are 
quite high (Table 3).  This serves as a reminder that although stratum-level estimates of 
welfare in household surveys are often referred to as representative, the sample size in these 
strata can be rather small so that the accompanying welfare estimates are not always precise.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 For a similar analysis, focusing specifically on poverty, see Demombynes et al (2002). 
10 On this, see also Mistiaen and Ravallion (2003). 
11  These issues are subject of current research.  If anything we expect the true difference between census-based 
and survey-based inequality estimates to be even larger, since in the simulations underlying poverty maps we 
regularly discard extreme draws of the error terms.  Again, this might lead to an under-representation of high-
expenditure cases.  13
Nonetheless, for our purposes it is encouraging to note that point estimates of the Gini 
coefficient between the survey and the census in Madagascar are often quite close. 
Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2002, 2003a) demonstrate that standard errors on 
census-based estimates are inversely correlated with the size of the target population.  Thus, 
although they may look good at the stratum level, estimates of inequality for smaller 
localities could become quite imprecise.  Does this imply that at fine levels of 
disaggregation – such as firaisana in Madagascar, or parroquia or zona in Ecuador – our 
inequality estimates are too noisy to be useful?  In the three countries we are working with 
here, we have produced estimates of inequality at the third administrative level (the 
firaisana in Madagascar, the parroquia in rural Ecuador, the administrative post in 
Mozambique).  Elbers et al (2002) document that standard errors correspond to about 5-15% 
of point estimates of inequality for these localities (see also below).  This is in the same 
range of what is generally judged to be acceptable at the stratum level in household surveys.  
Elbers et al (2002) also show that the explanatory power of simple descriptive OLS 
regressions of inequality at the smallest administrative level on a set of simple community 
characteristics is quite high in these three countries (R
2 ’s ranging between 0.57 and 0.78 in 
urban areas and between 0.38 and 0.57 in rural areas).  If the inequality estimates produced 
with this methodology were just noise, one would expect the explanatory power of these 
regressions to be much lower.
13   
Based on the evidence presented in this section, we conclude that the estimation 
technique used here can yield meaningful estimates of inequality for small areas.  Next, we 
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 Fortunately, as we shall see below, there is no evidence that the census-based estimates become even noisier 
at lower levels of aggregation in Mozambique.  14
focus our attention on inequality decompositions by administrative units and the 
heterogeneity of inequality across communities. 
 
4.  Decomposing inequality by geographic sub-groups 
We now turn to inequality decomposition by geographic sub-unit, which enjoys a long 
tradition in the empirical analysis of inequality, in both developed and developing countries.  
It is clear that when national inequality is attributable largely to differences in mean incomes 
across localities, the policy implications may be quite different from the situation, where 
sub-regions themselves are unequal and national inequality is basically an expression of 
heterogeneity that already exists at the local levels.  We decompose inequality using the 
General Entropy class of inequality measures, a class of measures that is particularly well 
suited for this exercise.
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13 Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2003b) argue that although the inequality measures included in these 
regressions have been estimated, this does not invalidate their use for these purposes (although they do 
advocate correcting standard errors for model error). 
14 Following Bourguignon (1979), Shorrocks (1980) and Cowell (1980).  Cowell (2000) provides a useful 
recent survey of  methods of inequality measurement, including a discussion of the various approaches to sub-
group decomposition.  Sen and Foster (1997) and Kanbur (2000) discuss some of the difficulties in interpreting 
results from such decompositions.  15
where fi is the population share of household i,  yi is per capita consumption of household i, 
µ is average per capita consumption, and c is a parameter that is to be selected by the user.
15  
This class of inequality measures can be decomposed into a between and within-group 
component along the following lines: 
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where j refers to sub-groups, gj refers to the population share of group j and GEj refers to 
inequality in group j. The between-group component of inequality is captured by the first 
term to the right of the equality sign.  It can be interpreted as measuring what would be the 
level of inequality in the population if everyone within the group had the same (the group-
average) consumption level µj.  The second term on the right reflects within-group 
inequality, or what would be the overall inequality level if there were no differences in mean 
consumption across groups but each group had its actual within-group inequality GEj.   
Ratios of the respective components with the overall inequality level provide a measure of 
the percentage contribution of between-group and within-group inequality to total 
inequality. 
                                                            
15 Lower values of c are associated with greater sensitivity to inequality amongst the poor, and higher values of 
c place more weight to inequality among the rich. A c value of 1 yields the well known Theil entropy measure, 
a value of 0 provides the Theil L or mean log deviation, and a value of 2 is ordinally equivalent to the squared 
coefficient of variation.  16
  In Table 4, we present the decomposition results in each of the three countries 
examined in this paper.  At one extreme, when inequality is measured at the national level, 
all inequality is, by definition, within-group.  At the other extreme, when each individual 
household is taken as a separate group, the within-group contribution to overall inequality is 
zero and all inequality is between-group.  But where does the between-group component 
start to outweigh the within-group component?  Is it reasonable to suppose that at a 
sufficiently low level of disaggregation, such as a village or community, inequality within 
groups is small, and most of overall inequality is due to differences between groups? 
  The first row for each country in Table 4 contains the share of inequality within and 
between communities, where community is defined as the third administrative level 
(number of households ranging between 1,000-10,000) in each of our three countries.  The 
inequality measure we use is the mean log deviation, i.e. GE(0).
16  The highest between-
group inequality is observed in Ecuador, at approximately 41%.  In Madagascar and 
Mozambique, the share of inequality that can be attributed to mean expenditure differences 
between communities is much smaller, at 25% and 22%, respectively.  There is also 
evidence, particularly in Ecuador, that the observed between-community inequality is due 
mainly to the differences between urban and rural communities.  When we focus our 
attention solely on rural communities in Ecuador, the between-group component of 
inequality falls to under 15% of total inequality in rural Ecuador.  Similarly in Madagascar, 
the share of between-group inequality in rural areas is 18%, significantly lower than for the 
combined rural and urban areas.  In all three countries, overall inequality is mostly 
                                                            
16 Results remain virtually identical for other values of c.  17
attributable to inequality within communities, even when the community is defined as the 
lowest level of central government administrative unit.
17 
18  
Interpretations of decompositions such as these are, however, not completely 
straightforward.  For example, the above decomposition results (documenting a large 
within-group component) do not imply that local inequality levels are uniformly high, or 
even that the majority of communities exhibit high levels of inequality.  It is important to 
recognize that the decomposition provides a summary statistic, suggesting that on 
average within-group inequality is not particularly low at the third administrative level.  
In other words, it is perfectly possible that a country is characterized by both highly equal 
and highly unequal communities.  A simple example can illustrate this.  Consider a 
population of 8 individuals with consumption values (1,1,2,2,4,4,5,5).  This population 
could be divided into two communities as (1,2,4,5) and (1,2,4,5); or as (1,1,5,5) and 
(2,2,4,4).  In both cases the two communities have the same average consumption.  As a 
result the between-group component from a decomposition exercise as has been carried 
out above is always zero (and the within-group share is thus 100% in both cases).   
However, in the first case inequality in the two communities is exactly equal to national 
inequality, whereas in the second case one community has a higher and the other a lower 
                                                            
17 Inequality estimates produced on the basis of the methodology described in section 2 are averages calculated 
over a number of simulations (100 in our case).  It is possible that a decomposition of inequality carried out 
after this averaging procedure has occurred overstates the within-group component of inequality because 
differences in inequality across communities have been smoothed out.  To check this we carried out the 
decomposition exercise for each of the 100 simulations and then averaged across the decomposition results.  
We found that the between group component of inequality increased by at most 1-2% and that our qualititative 
results were completely unchanged. 
18 We have no other reason to suspect that our methodology for estimating local level inequality is associated 
with any built-in tendency to over state within-group inequality.  One way to test this is to carry out the 
imputation exercise described here into a dataset that also contains information on welfare that has been directly 
collected, and to then compare decomposition results on the basis of imputed welfare against those on the basis 
of observed welfare.   Elbers, Lanjouw, Lanjouw and Leite (2003) undertake such an analysis in Brazil and 
show that a decomposition of inequality based on imputed consumption reaches virtually identical conclusions 
as a decomposition based on observed income.  18
level of inequality than at the national level.  Hence, finding a high within-group share 
from a decomposition exercise across a large number of communities is perfectly 
consistent with great heterogeneity in inequality levels across those same communities.  
It is then natural to ask, in our case, whether communities vary widely in their degree of 
inequality. 
  In Figures 1-5, we plot community-level inequality estimates and compare these 
with overall inequality.  Communities are ranked from most equal to most unequal, and 95% 
confidence intervals on each community-level estimate are included as scatter plots.  Figure 
1 compares parroquia level inequality in rural Ecuador against the overall inequality level in 
rural areas.  We see that although the within-group share from the decomposition was as 
high as 86%, this summary statistic masks considerable variation in parroquia inequality 
levels.  A large majority of parroquia-level point estimates are well below the national level 
in rural Ecuador.  Even allowing for the imprecision around the parroquia-level estimates 
(which are typically 5-15% of the point estimate), a sizeable proportion of parroquias are 
unambiguously more equal than the picture at the national level. Another sizeable 
proportion is not obviously less or more unequal than the country as a whole, and a smaller 
number of parroquias are considerably more unequal.
19  In urban Ecuador (Figure 2), the 
proportion of zonas that have lower inequality than the national-level inequality rate is even 
higher than in rural areas.  The precision of point estimates in urban areas of Ecuador is 
somewhat higher than in rural areas; accordingly, more zonas lie unambiguously below the 
national inequality level. 
                                                            
19 Note the reason that there are more communities with inequality below the national level than above the 
national level is due to the fact that between-group inequality, while relatively small, is not absent.  Differences 
in average per capita consumption ensure that at least some of total inequality is attributable to differences 
between groups.  If there were no within-group inequality at all, or if all communities had the same level of  19
In rural and urban Madagascar (Figures 3 and 4) and in Mozambique (Figure 5) the 
picture is very similar.  In each of the three countries, there is clearly a sizeable subset of 
communities with lower inequality than the country as a whole, another large group for 
which inequality is not significantly different from inequality in the country as a whole, and 
a small third group of communities with inequality higher than the national level.  
 
5.  Are Poor Communities More Equal than Others? 
In the last section, we noted that while most of the inequality in Ecuador, 
Madagascar, and Mozambique is attributable to inequality within communities, there is a lot 
of heterogeneity in inequality across these communities within each country.  In this section, 
we ask whether inequality is less marked if we focus our attention on poor communities.  
CBD programs are often targeted primarily to poor communities.  If those communities 
have low levels of inequality, it may be less important that policymakers incorporate 
information on inequality into the design and implementation of CBD projects.   
Unfortunately, it turns out that this is not the case for the countries examined in this paper. 
Figures 6, 8, and 10 present the range of inequality (measured by the commonly 
used Gini index) across communities in each country by quintiles of the imputed headcount 
index (see Demombynes et al, 2003).
20  The Gini index at the community level ranges from 
0.299 to 0.501 in Ecuador, 0.231 to 0.466 in Madagascar, and 0.261 to 0.534 in 
Mozambique.
21  Interestingly, in all three countries, median inequality in the poorest quintile 
                                                                                                                                                                             
within-group inequality, then overall inequality would be greater than or equal to inequality in each of the 
individual communities.  
20 It is possible that we would observe high inequality in high poverty areas simply because of the fact that 
these two measures of welfare are highly correlated.  However, the results presented in this section are the same 
if we rank communities by their mean consumption levels instead of the headcount index. 
21 These reported ranges exclude the top and bottom 1% of communities (in terms of the Gini index) in each 
country.  20
is not lower than that in any of the richer quintiles.  Furthermore, the range of inequality 
levels across communities is among the widest in the poorest quintile.  This observation 
remains true even when we restrict our attention to rural communities only (Figures 7 & 9).  
We conclude that a typical poor community in any of these three countries – even if it is in a 
rural area – is at least as unequal as other communities, and that the range of inequality 
among poor communities is not narrower than the country as a whole.  The next section 
discusses the possible policy implications of our findings. 
 
6. Policy  Discussion 
There has been a massive increase in resources devoted to CDD programs in the past 
10 years.  The review by Mansuri and Rao (2003) suggests that between 1996 and 2003, 
funding for CDD projects rose from around US$325 million to around $2 billion.  While the 
main goal is to achieve better outcomes by involving local communities in the decision-
making process and management of projects, governments nonetheless need some basic 
indicators to target communities and tailor basic features of these projects to different types 
of communities.  So far, governments have commonly utilized type of area (urban/rural) and 
proxy information on poverty at the community level for such purposes. 
In this paper, we propose another measure of welfare, namely inequality at the 
community level, as a possible additional indicator to inform the design of decentralized 
anti-poverty programs and CDD projects.  Recent theory and limited empirical evidence 
suggests that inequality may be related to outcomes at the community level.  It is possible 
that inequality at the community level may lead to the capture of the intended benefits by the 
local elite or inequality may simply be highly correlated with another (not easily observed)  21
factor that leads to elite capture.  Collective action and the subsequent provision of public 
goods may also be correlated with the level of inequality within communities. 
A recently developed small area estimation technique can provide estimates of 
inequality at the local level.  In the three different countries examined here, we find that 
although, on average, most of the consumption inequality in each of Ecuador, Madagascar, 
and Mozambique is attributable to inequality within communities, local inequality varies 
widely across communities.  Furthermore, we find that inequality is highly heterogeneous 
even in the poorest communities in these countries.  Not only is inequality in a typical poor 
community as high as in other communities, but the range of inequality levels among poor 
communities is at least as wide as it is in richer communities.  This finding remains true 
even when we restrict our attention to rural areas. 
Our findings suggest that local inequality can provide additional information even 
after controlling for the type of area and the poverty levels of communities.  It is possible 
that use of such information can enhance desired outcomes.  For example, for transfer 
programs where it is intended that local communities identify poor beneficiaries, eligible 
communities could broadly be categorized as low, middle, and high inequality.  Random 
audits and means-tested targeting by the central government (as are conducted, for example, 
in Mexico’s PROGRESA program) could then be considered to improve pro-poor targeting 
in the middle and high inequality communities.   
Clearly, a first priority is to undertake further and more systematic research into the 
relationship between local inequality and various development outcomes.  A critical 
question concerns the manner and extent to which current development processes and 
practices interact with local inequality.  Better estimates of local level consumption  22
inequality made possible through application of the techniques described in section 2 of this 
paper, as well as through other related approaches, offer important new opportunities for 
analysis.  At present, micro-level estimation of welfare based on the methodology described 
here has been completed or is currently underway in some 25 developing countries.  Such 
estimates can be combined with detailed information on the operation of anti-poverty 
programs and CBD projects in these countries, with an eye toward uncovering systematic 
relationships, positive or negative.  23
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Table 1. Data Summary 
   Ecuador Madagascar Mozambique 
Household Survey      
  Year 1994  1993-4  1996-7 
 Source  Encuesta  de 
Condiciones de Vida 
(ECV) 
Enquête Permanente Auprès 
des Ménages (EPM) 
Inquérito Nacional aos 
Agregados Familiares 
sobre as Condições de 
Vida (IAF96) 
  Sample Size  4,500 Households  4,508 Households  8,250 Households 
  References  Hentschel and Lanjouw 
(1996); and 
Hentschel, Lanjouw, 





Simler and Nhate (2002) 
Population Census  
    
  Year  1990 1993  1997 
 Coverage  About  10  million 
individuals in  2 million 
households 
about 11.9 million individuals 
in 2.4 million households 
about 16 million 
individuals  
in 3.6 million households   
  27
Table 2. Comparison of Survey and Census-Based Average Per-Capita 
Consumption Estimates at the Stratum Level 
 
                      Ecuador  Madagascar  Mozambique 
  Sucres per capita    Francs per capita    Meticais per capita 










































































































































































(54869)      
All household survey estimates are computed using weights that are the product of household survey weights 
and household size. The census-based estimates are calculated weighting by household size. Standard errors are 
in parentheses.  28
Table 3. Comparison of Survey and Census-Based Inequality Estimates 
(Gini) at the Stratum Level 
 








































































































































































































(0.048)      
All household survey estimates are computed using weights that are the product of household survey weights 
and household size. The census-based estimates are calculated weighting by household size. Standard errors are 
in parentheses.  29









Ecuador     
  All Communities  1579 58.8  41.2 
  Urban  664 76.7  23.3 
  Rural   915 85.9  14.1 
Madagascar      
  All Communities  1248 74.6  25.4 
  Urban  131 76.7  23.2 
  Rural  1117 81.9  18.1 
Mozambique      
  All Communities  424 78.0  22.0 
Our communities in Ecuador are Zonas in urban areas and Parroquias in rural areas.  
Communities are Firiasana (communes) in Madagascar and Administrative Posts in Mozambique. 
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Figure 10  
 
 